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DEVELOPMENT OF ANOMALOUS COMPUTER 
BEHAVIOR DETECTION METHOD BASED ON 
PROBABILISTIC AUTOMATON 
 
OPRACOWYWANIE METODY WYKRYWANIA 
ZACHOWANIA KOMPUTEROWEGO W ZAKRESIE 
AUTOMATYKI PROBABILISTYCZNEJ 
 
This work proposes anomalous computer system behav-
ior detection method based on probabilistic automaton. Main 
components of the method are automaton structure generation 
model and its modification procedure. The distinctive feature 
of the method is the adaptation of the automaton structure gen-
eration procedure for detecting attack scenarios of the same 
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type, by restructuring the automaton upon a match and by re-
calculating the probability of state changes. 
Proposed method allows to speed up the detection of 
anomalous computer behavior, as well as to detect anomalies in 
computer systems, scenario profiles of which only partially 
match the instances used to generate automaton structure. The 
obtained results allow us to conclude that the developed meth-
od can be used in heuristic analyzers of anomaly detection sys-
tems. 
Keywords: anomalous computer system behavior, probabilis-
tic automaton, automaton state graph, heuristic analyzer, 
anomaly detection systems. 
Introduction 
Enhancing the security of a computer system presents 
as complex of difficult and, generally, interrelated scientific 
and technical problems solved at various levels using appropri-
ate organizational and technical measures both to ensure the in-
tegrity, availability and confidentiality of the protected infor-
mation, and to ensure the protection of used network admin-
istration methods, technologies of access to provided services, 
the established order of storage and transmission of data. 
Currently, various mechanisms are used to solve afore-
mentioned problems, the most effective of which consist of 
technologies for detection and prevention of unsanctioned use 
of network resources, so called Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS)208 and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)209. The basis of 
                                                                
208
 Farooq Anjum, Petros Mouchtaris, "Intrusion Detection Systems," in Se-
curity for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, Wiley, 2007. doi: 
10.1002/9780470118474.ch5 
209
 A. H. Al-Hamami and G. M. W. Al-Saadoon, "Development of a net-
work-based: Intrusion Prevention System using a Data Mining approach," 
2013 Science and Information Conference, London, 2013, pp. 641-644. 
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their operation is the collection, analysis and processing of in-
formation about events related to the security of a given com-
puter system, the accumulation of the collected data, and mak-
ing decisions about the state of the system with detection and 
counteraction to unauthorized use of computational resources 
based on analysis results.  
It should be noted that intrusion detection systems pro-
vide additional level of computer system protection and are 
used for detection of some types of malicious activity, which 
might compromise system’s security. Such activities include 
network attacks against vulnerable services, attacks targeted at 
privilege escalation, unauthorized access to important informa-
tional resources, as well as actions of malicious software (com-
puter viruses, Trojans, worms)210. IDS further subdivide into 
Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS)211, which register system 
deviations from normal behavior, and systems which detect to 
known attacks, or Misuse Detection Systems (MDS)212. Unfor-
tunately, either of the systems currently have shortcomings. 
One of the main problems is the imperfection of testing meth-
ods. 
The literature analysis has shown213 that, currently de-
velopers are trying to solve this problem, and propose various 
solutions (the use of neural networks and descriptive statistics, 
expert systems, etc.). One of the promising areas for improve-
                                                                
210
 S.V. Goshko, Technologies of fight against computer viruses, Mos-
cow:Solon Press, 2009. Show Context 
211
 Bernhard Schölkopf; John Platt; Thomas Hofmann, "In-Network PCA 
and Anomaly Detection," in Advances in Neural Information Processing 
Systems 19: Proceedings of the 2006 Conference , MITP, 2007. 
212
 Elisa Bertino, "Data Protection from Insider Threats," in Data Protection 
from Insider Threats, Morgan & Claypool, 2012, pp. 
213
 Ying Tan, "Immune Principle and Neural Networks-Based Malware De-
tection," in Artificial Immune System: Applications in Computer Security, 
IEEE, 2016, pp. 
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ment of testing and anomaly detection methods is the use of 
probabilistic automaton theory214. 
Thus, the purpose of the article is to develop an anoma-
lous computer system behavior detection method based on 
probabilistic automaton theory. 
Anomaly detection method development 
Metoda wykrywania anomalii -rozwój 
The proposed approach to computer system behavior 
analysis has two stages. First stage consists of automaton struc-
ture generation and creation of anomalous computer system 
behavior profiles. Second stage is to check the system for 
anomalies according to the profiles generated in the first stage.  
The input data for profile generation consists of various 
discrete events: system calls, process identifiers or sections 
of code, which lead to anomalous system behavior. 
Input data (instances) are grouped by classes, for exam-
ple, sections of code, inherent to malicious software class of 
type Trojan. Then, for one of the class instances, the automaton 
structure is generated, which is then further refined when ana-
lyzing subsequent instances of the same class. A set of discrete 
events of the class instance is input to the system, each of 
which is matched with the automaton state si. The possibility of 
transition from the sk state to the sm state at the time t is deter-
mined by the input state xm and coefficient Km, specifying the 
change of the probability of the transition pkm from state sk into 
sm. Initially the value of Km is zero. Transition probabilities pi 
(Perfect_Key) are set in the system settings are initially equal 
to 1. They store the value of the matches of input data with the 
already generated automaton transition conditions. The transi-
                                                                
214
 R.G. Bukharayev, Bases of the theory of probabilistic automatic ma-
chines, Moscow:Science, 1985. Show Context 
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tion probabilities pi are recalculated each time the coefficient 
Km is changed.  
Coefficient Km increases in presence of event of the 
same type within different instances of the same class, de-
scribed by the same chain of transitions from the sk state to the 
sm state, and decreases otherwise. Such an approach also makes 
it possible to reduce the number of automaton states due to the 
presence of common segment of automaton transitions from 
the sk state to the sm state. An increase in Ki leads to increase in 
the value of pi (Perfect_Key), that is, the percentage of matches 
between input data and already generated transition conditions 
increases, which in turn will reduce the likelihood of false 
alarms.  
The automaton structure generation and testing of given 
computer system for matches with generated anomaly profiles 
or their modifications is shown on fig. 1,2. 
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Fig. 1. Automaton structure generation 
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Fig. 2. Testing of computer system behavior for matches with 
generated classes of anomalies or their modifications 
 
Since scenarios contain loops, branches and functions, a 
settings (modes) block is used for conversion of scenarios into 
a discrete linear sequence of events. The settings block allows 
to set the operation modes: loop handling, condition handling, 
data processing (with or without variable values taken in con-
sideration), standard function processing (with or without ar-
guments), maximum number of iterations per loop statement, 
probability of pi (Perfect_Key) state transitions. Additionally, 
to detect events of the same type, the variable Rk (recursion 
depth) is introduced. Recursion depth allows reading Rk gen-
erations of ancestors and descendants to determine identical 
sections.  
Decision-Making System (DMS) consists of two parts: 
 a block of memory, which stores information about an-
cestors of current state, descendants of current state, and 
indeterminate states, which are neighbors which can be 
classified as both ancestors and descendants; 
 a block of rules for probabilistic automaton structure 
generation. 
The block of rules for probabilistic automaton structure genera-
tion contains: 
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 rules for probabilistic automaton generation; 
 rules for checking probabilistic automaton for errors; 
 rule for correcting probabilistic automaton errors; 
 rules for forming the classes (final states) of the probabil-
istic automaton; 
 optimization rules for probabilistic automaton. 
The decision-making system functions according to the previ-
ously specified settings and adjusts the value of the probability 
table at each step of the automaton operation. 
The parameter Rk defines the visibility scope of DMS 
within the automaton. Fig. 3 shows an example of memory 
contents of decision-making system for the recursion depth 
Rk = 5. (i.e., the DMS stores the neighbors, the path to which 
range from 1 to 5 transitions) 
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Fig. 3. Memory contents of decision-making system for the 
recursion depth Rk = 5 
where: 
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1 - pointer to the current state of the machine (other 
states are referenced through this state); 
2 - ancestor states for the current state; 
3 - descendant states for the current state; 
4 - indeterminate states (which are states that are seen 
by the system with a give Rk as both ancestors and 
descendants); 
5 - automaton state, which isn’t referenced in DMS, but 
are a part of probabilistic automaton. 
 
Consider probabilistic automaton structure generation, 
for example, for the sections of code which lead to anomalous 
system behavior, which are shown in table 1. A, B, C, D - are 
the events, inherent for a certain class of anomaly. 
We shall introduce notation for automaton states: S0(t) - 
initial automaton state, Si(t) -current automaton state, Sk0 - final 
automaton state, which corresponds to normal system behavior, 
Sk1 - final automaton state, which corresponds to anomaly type 
Sk1, Sk2 - final automaton state, which corresponds to anomaly 
type Sk2. Since the amount of commands in one event is small, 
we first set Perfect_Key = 0.25, P = 0. 
 
Table 1. 
 Automaton generation data 
Anomalies classes 
Anomalies scenarios 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Sk1 A B C D B C E B C 
Sk2 D D D D D F D D H 
 
Generation of this example takes 24 steps (fig. 4-27) 
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-> Event A
Event B
Event C
Decision-Making System 
Index
 
Fig. 4. Initialization. Creation of initial state of a probabilistic 
automaton 
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Index
 
Fig. 5. Handling of the first event of the first scenario of Sk1 
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Event A
Event B
-> Event C S1
A
S2B
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Index
 
Fig. 6. Handling of the second event of the first scenario of Sk1 
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S0
Event A
Event B
Event C S1
A
S2B
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-> Event D
Event B
Event C
Decision-Making System 
Index
 
Fig. 7. Handling of the last event of the first scenario. Creation 
of final state Sk1 
 
S0
Event A
Event B
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S2B
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Event C
S3D
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Index
 
Fig. 8. Handling of the first event of the second scenario of Sk1 
 
In this example, the recursion depth of the DMS is 
equal to three. Therefore, the next processed event won’t 
generate a new state, and goes to S2 instead (fig. 9). 
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Fig. 9. Handling of the second event of the second scenario 
of Sk1 
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When analyzing event C, DMS detects that this 
transition condition already exists. As a result, positive 
coefficient will increase the requirements of incoming data and 
reference matches. (fig. 10) 
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Fig. 10. Handling of the last event of the second scenario of Sk1 
The following steps repeat the previous steps by 
analyzing another scenario (fig. 11-13). 
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Fig. 11. Handling of the first event of the last scenario of Sk1 
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Fig. 12. Handling of the second event of the last scenario of Sk1 
The optimization of the automaton begins after all 
scenarios of a single anomaly class are analyzed. Decision-
making system index is in the final state of the automaton, and 
moves towards the initial state, performing optimization of the 
automaton. The optimization process ends when the initial state 
is reached. In this example DMS references first state of the 
automaton, thus the automaton will be optimized in a single 
iteration. (fig. 13) 
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Fig. 13. Handling of the last event of the last scenario of Sk1. 
Beginning of optimization 
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First, DMS finds state transition condition which point 
to the same state S2. We optimize the automaton by removing 
states S3 and S4, and combining their transition condition to 
point from S0 to S1. The coefficient is increased by two, as 
a result of two states being removed.  
Secondly, after optimizing the states, we need to 
combine coefficient of the sequential states. Result of such 
optimizations is shown on fig. 14. 
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Event E
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Index
 
Fig. 14. Automaton optimization 
Handling of the input scenarios of second class is 
shown on fig. 15. 
S0
S1A
B
Sk1C
D
+4
E
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-> Event D
Event D
Event D
Decision-Making System 
Index
 
Fig. 15. Initialization and preparation for handling of second 
class of anomalous behavior  
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Coefficient does not increase, because the first 
command is seen from state S0 (Fig. 16) 
 
S0
S1A
B
Sk1C
D
+4
E
S2
Event D
-> Event D
Event D
Decision-Making System 
Index  
Fig. 16. Handling of the first event of the first scenario of Sk2 
S0
S1A
B
Sk1C
D
+4
E
S2
Event D
Event D
-> Event D
D
Decision-Making System 
Index
 
Fig. 17. Handling of the second event of the first scenario 
of Sk2 
During the handling third event, we encounter 
a paradox - last event coincides with the loop of current state. 
This loop should be removed in order to generate Sk2. At the 
same time, coefficient of the new condition is set to 6. (Such 
coefficient makes Perfect_Key equal to 1) (fig. 18) 
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Event D
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-> Event D
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Event F
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Decision-Making System 
Index
 
Fig. 18. Handling of the last event of the first scenario of Sk2. 
Generation of the final state for second anomaly class 
We encounter a match with first scenario, when 
processing the first event. Therefore we reduce the coefficient 
of Sk2 by 1. The coefficient of transition to S1 through event 
D is increased by 1. It should be noted that all these actions are 
performed only because the transitions are within the visibility 
scope of DMS. (fig. 19-20) 
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Fig. 19. Handling of the first event of the second scenario 
of Sk2 
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Fig. 20. Handling of the second event of the second 
scenario of Sk2 
As can be seen on fig. 21, we do not process the last 
event of the second scenario, because DMS is already in the 
final state. 
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Index
 
Fig. 21. Handling of the last event of the second scenario of Sk2 
(change of coefficients) 
Similar actions occur during the processing of the last 
scenario (fig. 22-24) 
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Fig. 22. Handling of the first event of the last scenario of Sk2 
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Fig. 23. Handling of the second event of the last scenario of Sk2 
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Fig. 24. Handling of the last event of the last scenario of Sk2. 
Beginning of the optimizations 
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Fig. 25. Automaton optimization 
After forming all the anomaly classes, we need to create 
a class of normal behavior. After that, we should add transitions 
from non-terminal states to Sk0. The condition for these 
transitions is satisfied when no other transition matches. Thus, 
the automaton has complete transition matrix. (Fig. 26-27) 
S0
A
B Sk1C
D
+4
E
S2
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S1+6
+4
Sk0
Decision-Making System 
Index
 
Fig. 26. Creation of final state for safe behaviors Sk0 
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Fig. 27. The finalized probabilistic automaton 
Software was developed for testing the proposed 
method (fig. 28). This software allows setting various 
parameters and modes and generating the structure of the 
automaton for a certain class of anomalies. 
The simulation results confirm the possibility to 
identify computer system anomalies, profiles of which only 
partially match the instances used to generate automaton 
structure. Fig. 29 summarizes the experimental results. The 
recognition process lasted 500 seconds. As can be seen from 
the graph, about 96% of the anomalies were detected within 
500 seconds. 
 
 
 256 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 28. Probabilistic automaton generator and the result of 
heuristic method 
 
Fig. 29. Detection accuracy rate over time (in seconds) 
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Conclusions 
Anomalous computer system behavior detection meth-
od based on probabilistic automaton was developed in this 
work.  
A distinctive feature of the method is the adaptation of 
automaton structure generation procedure for detecting scenar-
ios of same type, by fixing the visibility scope of automaton 
state graph, and by monitoring ancestor and descendant states 
with automatic restructuring the automaton upon a match and 
recalculation of probability of state changes. This approach al-
lows to reduce the number of machine states to 90%. In prac-
tice this will allow to reduce the amount of memory required to 
store generated automaton structure, and speed up the process 
of detecting anomalous computer system behavior.  
 The input data for the automaton consist of various 
discrete events grouped by classes (system calls, process iden-
tifiers or sections of code, DoS attack scenarios) inherent for 
a certain type of anomalous computer system behavior.  
Main components of the method are automaton struc-
ture generation model and its modification procedure.  
One of the main components of the automaton structure 
generation model is decision-making system configuration al-
gorithm, which allows to set various modes of handling incom-
ing events, (handling of standard functions (with or with-out 
parameters), the maximum number of iterations per loop 
statement, etc.). Use of those input event handling modes 
makes it possible to change visibility scope of automaton state 
graph and to optimize the process of computer system state 
evaluation according by criteria of minimum time and maxi-
mum accuracy. 
In the process of using the generated automaton struc-
ture, it can be updated in the event of anomalies occurring with 
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different scenarios. The results of comparative study have 
shown that the proposed method allows to detect anomalies in 
computer systems, scenario profiles of which only partially 
match the instances used to generate automaton structure. The 
obtained results allow us to conclude that the developed meth-
od can be used in heuristic analyzers of anomaly detection sys-
tems. 
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